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I. INTRODUCTION

Juvenile curfew laws enjoy overwhelming political popularity.' Laws
requiring adolescents to be indoors during certain hours of the night have been
around for decades, but there has been a resurgence of both enactment and enforcement in recent years. Beginning in the early 1990's, a flood of over a thousand new curfew laws were adopted nationwide, and many pre-existing curfew
laws, long unenforced, were revived.2 A 2000 study of the cities in the United
States with a population of 15,000 or more found that an estimated two-thirds
have enacted juvenile curfew laws. 3 Although many of these curfew laws are
decades old, enforcement has been relatively dormant until recently.4 This
widespread revival can be attributed to the common use of child curfew laws as
a quick fix by many local government officials in response to citizens' concerns
over rising crime rates. 5
Some West Virginia cities have also decided that juvenile curfews are
the answer. One recent example is an ordinance passed in Huntington, West
Virginia in September 20056 which was modeled after the Charleston curfew
approved by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in 2000.' Support for
the curfew emerged after a prom night shooting earlier in the year that left four
young persons dead. 8 The shooting occurred during the early hours of the morning in a part of town that was well known as a high crime area.9 Similar to this
response in Huntington, other West Virginia cities may decide to follow the
national trend, and many more child curfew laws could be enacted in the coming years.
I

Note, Juvenile Curfews and the Major Confusion over Minor Rights, 118 HARv. L. REv.

2400, 2400 (2005) [hereinafter Juvenile Curfews]. A CBS News and New York Times poll revealed "87% support for an 11 p.m. weekday juvenile curfew." Id. at n.10.
2
Deirdre E. Norton, Why Criminalize Children? Looking Beyond the Express PoliciesDriving Juvenile Curfew Legislation, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 175, 175 (2001).
3
Andra J. Bannister et al., Policies and Practices Related to Juvenile Curfews 7 (2000),
available at http'/www.wsurcpi.org/papers/policy-papers/CurfewResearch.pdf (last visited Mar.
2, 2006).

Angie Schwartz & Lucy Wang, ProliferatingCurfew Laws Keeps Kids at Home, but Fail to
CurbJuvenile Crime, YouT LAW NEWS, 1 (2005).
4

5

Id.

HUNTINGrON, W. VA., ORDINANcES, art. 525 (2005), available at http'/www.
huntingtonnews.net/local/files/curfew.pdf.
7
CHARLESTON, W. VA., CODE § 18-17 (2000).
6

8

Bryan Chambers, Council Beefs up Minors Curfew, HERALD-DISPATCH, Sept. 27, 2005, at

iC.
9

Bryan Chambers & Scott Wartman, FourShot to Death: Fairfield West Residents Struggle

with Killings of Young People, HERAiD-DsPATCH, May 23, 2005, available at httpJ/www.herald-

dispatch.com/2005/May/23/LNspot.htrL
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Although the constitutional legitimacy of child curfew laws has been
validated by both the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit1 °
and the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals," there is division among the
United States Courts of Appeals regarding the constitutionality of juvenile curfews.' 2 The circuits are divided as to whether a minor possesses the fundamental right of freedom of movement, and if so, whether the right should be reduced
due to their age. 13 There is also division regarding the appropriate degree of
scrutiny that should be applied. 14 Even among the circuits that have applied the
same level of scrutiny, the outcomes of those cases have been divergent.' 5 The
United States Supreme Court has denied certiorari every time the issue has
come before it, and as a result, the states have been left to sort out the issues for
themselves with increasingly mixed outcomes.
This Article will examine the constitutionality of juvenile curfews. Part
II of this Article will provide a background of juvenile curfews including a history of curfew laws, a discussion of common constitutional challenges, and a
review of the current split among the United States Courts of Appeals. Part III
will analyze the validity of juvenile curfews, the approach that should be taken
by the United States Supreme Court, and the impact of juvenile curfew laws in
West Virginia. Finally, this Article will conclude that broad juvenile curfew
laws should be found unconstitutional under both strict and intermediate scrutiny analysis because they restrict the fundamental right of freedom of movement.

10

Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 1998) (upholding a juvenile

curfew as constitutional).
"
Sale ex rel. Sale v. Goldman, 539 S.E.2d 446 (W. Va. 2000) (upholding a juvenile curfew as
constitutional).
12
Compare Hodgkins v. Peterson, 355 F.3d 1048 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding juvenile curfew
ordinance to be unconstitutional), Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 184-85 (2d Cir. 2003)
(same), and Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 1997) (same), with Hutchins v.
District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc) (upholding juvenile curfew ordinance as constitutional), Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 1998) (same),
Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993) (same), and Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown,
401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975), affld, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976) (same).
13
Compare Hutchins, 188 F.3d 531 (holding that a minor does not possess the fundamental
right of free movement), and Qutb, 11 F.3d 488 (same), with Ramos, 353 F.3d 171 (holding that a
minor does possess the fundamental right of free movement), Schleifer, 159 F.3d 843 (same),
Nunez, 114 F.3d 935 (same), and Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (same).
14
Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (applying rational basis); Ramos, 353 F.3d 171 (applying intermediate scrutiny), Hutchins, 188 F.3d 531 (same), and Schleifer, 159 F.3d 843 (same); Nunez,
114 F.3d 935 (applying strict scrutiny), and Qutb, 11 F.3d 488 (same).
15
The Second and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeals applied intermediate scrutiny with different outcomes. The Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals applied strict scrutiny with different
outcomes. See cases cited supra note 14.
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II. BACKGROUND

A.

History of Curfew Laws

A curfew is an order by the government which requires certain people to
be off the streets during specified hours. 16 For hundreds of years, curfews have
been used to maintain public order and to suppress targeted or politically unpopular groups. Throughout history, curfews have commonly been based on
youth, gender, ethnicity, or race.17 In addition, curfews have been used in times
of emergency to protect citizens from riots and public unrest.1 8 Before the Civil
War, the Confederate states utilized curfews to ensure that slaves returned home
by a certain hour of the day.' 9 One of the best-known United States curfew
laws, enacted during World War II, imposed a curfew
on Japanese-Americans
20
based on the purported necessity of national defense.
Juvenile curfews gained significant political support for the first time in
the late nineteenth century. 2 ' President Benjamin Harrison claimed that these
laws were "the most important municipal regulation for the protection of the
children of American homes, from the vices of the street.
,22 By the turn of
the century, approximately 3,000 towns and cities in the United States had enacted some form of curfew law.23 This first juvenile curfew movement was
short-lived, and the curfews quickly disappeared or fell into disuse. 2 The brief
duration of this movement was likely due to the fact that the nation's priorities
changed when its attention was shifted to World War I, prohibition, and the depressionY5 However, during World War II, public interest in teen curfews was
once again renewed when many parents left to go to war. 26 The wartime curfews attempted to prevent adolescents from roaming the streets or loitering in
public places while their parents were either overseas, or working nightshifts in
war industries, and were not available to carefully watch their children as a result. 27 Since World War H, juvenile curfews have remained in existence and
16

BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 410 (8th ed. 2004).

17

See Norton, supra note 2, at 185-91.
Id. at 185.
Note, Curfew Ordinances and the Control of Nocturnal Juvenile Crime, 107 U. PA. L. REV.

18
19

66, 66 n.5 (1958). [hereinafter Curfew Ordinances](citing 8 ENCYC. AMERICANA 306 (1957 ed.)).
Curfews were enforced against black slaves prior to the civil war in the 1860's. Id.
20
See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
21
Curfew Ordinances,supra note 19, at 66 n.5.
22
Id. (citing 8 ENCYC. AMERICANA 306 (3d ed. 1925)). Benjamin Harrison was president from
1889 to 1893.
See Bannister, supranote 3, at 3.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
See Curfew Ordinances, supra note 19, at 66 n.5.
27
Id.
23
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have received continuing public support; however, most have not been enforced
by local governments until recently.28
Beginning in the early 1990's there was an explosion in the number of
new juvenile curfews enacted and renewed enforcement of those already in existence. 29 President Bill Clinton, as part of his family values advocacy, promoted
30
juvenile curfews, touting them as a tool to combat juvenile delinquency.
Many politicians began to promote curfew laws because they believed it would
demonstrate to their constituents that they are tough on law and order issues. 3'
As juvenile crime and victimization rates increased throughout the early 1990's,
the overwhelming response by communities across the board was to enact teen
curfew laws.3 2
It is possible that public anxiety resulting from fear of gang violence, or
isolated incidents, such as the Columbine High School shooting in Littleton,
Colorado is the real driver behind such laws.33 Although the motivation behind
these laws relates to a genuine issue, it is not clear that the laws are effective at
achieving the desired result. A national study documenting the increase in
number of new curfew laws conducted in the year 2000 indicated that this increase was in response to the public's frustration and fear related to the violent
crimes involving children that are heard about on the news. 34 However, there is
no evidence to suggest that nocturnal juvenile curfews would necessarily prevent violent juvenile crime or the sort of mass school violence that occurred in
Littleton because most juvenile crime does not occur at night.35 These restrictive laws are simply an ineffective, knee-jerk, political response to satiate citizens' fears.
B.

Constitutional Challenges

As juvenile curfew laws continue to gain popularity, constitutional
rights advocates rally in opposition.36 With the support of these groups, the
constitutionality of juvenile curfews has been challenged on several different
grounds including violations of youths' rights to free expression, religion, and
assembly, parents' rights to raise their children as they see fit, and youths' rights
28
29

See Bannister, supra note 3, at 9.
Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., The Proliferationof Juvenile Curfews, ABA Juv. JUST. vol. 12, no.

1 (Spring 1997), availableat http:/www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/cjcurfew.html.
30

Id.

31

See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1.
See Juvenile Curfews, supra note 1, at 2403.
33
See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1.
34
Id.
35
Id. at2.
36
See, e.g., Rich Jahn, Analysis of U.S. Curfew Laws, httpJ/www.youthrights.org/
curfewana.shtml (last visited Mar. 2, 2006); Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1.
32
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to freedom of movement.37 Most juvenile curfew cases include challenges on
all of these grounds. The First Amendment claims have been successful on occasion, but for the most part, the courts have rejected this claim. 38 Likewise, the
claims involving a parent's right to raise their children as they see fit have been
largely unsuccessful. 39 The most promising challenge is the claim that the curfew laws unconstitutionally restrict the minor's fundamental right of freedom of
movement.40
Many constitutional challenges of juvenile curfews include a claim of
infringement of the First Amendment right to freedom of expression, religion,
and assembly, stating that curfews squelch free exercise of these rights. 4 1 By
requiring youth to be at home or otherwise indoors during the night, they may
be prevented from engaging in protected activities such as political and religious
gatherings. These challenges typically fail because most juvenile curfew ordinances contain exceptions for First Amendment activities.4 2 These exceptions
provide an affirmative defense for violating the juvenile curfew. However, it
must be noted that the inclusion of this affirmative defense for First Amendment
activities will only survive constitutional analysis if the restriction is sufficiently
narrowly tailored to serve a significant government purpose.43 In other words, it
would not matter that an affirmative defense is included if young persons are
still dissuaded from participating in protected activities because they want to
avoid the hassle and embarrassment of being arrested by the police. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found a juvenile curfew to be
unconstitutionally restrictive under the First Amendment because the threat of
arrest would "unduly chill[] the exercise of a minor's First Amendment
rights." 44 To avoid this problem, some municipalities now include language in
the curfew ordinance that requires police officers to conduct a reasonable inquiry before making a citation or arrest.
See cases cited supra note 12.
See infra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
39 See infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
40
Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 184-85 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that a minor possesses the fundamental right of free movement); Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843
(4th Cir. 1998) (same); Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 1997) (same); Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975) aff'd, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.
1976) (same).
41
Hodgkins ex. rel. Hodgkins v. Peterson, 355 F.3d 1048, 1064 (7th Cir. 2004); Hutchins v.
District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 546-48 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc); Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 85354; Nunez, 114 F.3d at 949-51; Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 494 (5th Cir. 1993); and Bykofsky,
401 F. Supp. 1242.
42
The Seventh Circuit struck down a juvenile curfew on first amendment grounds. See Hodgkins, 355 F.3d at 1064. Most of the circuits have rejected first amendment claims brought against
juvenile curfews. See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 546-48; Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 853-54; Nunez, 114
F.3d at 949-51; Qutb, 11 F.3d at 494; Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. 1242.
43
Hodgkins, 355 F.3d at 1064.
37
38

44

Id.
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To combat this view, it has been argued that the affirmative First
Amendment defense for violation of the curfew law is inadequate because it is
vague and overbroad. 45 The vagueness argument is that law enforcement officials are not given adequate standards to follow, and that ordinary citizens do
not understand the complexities of constitutional law and do not always know
what makes up a First Amendment righti 6 However, the courts have generally
rejected this contention stating that a general First Amendment defense is not
unconstitutionally vague because the rights that fall under the First Amendment
are well known to the public. 47 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit remarked that it should be perfectly clear to everyone that political protests and religious worship are examples of activities that would be included under this defense. 48
Another common constitutional challenge to juvenile curfews is that the
laws infringe on the fundamental rights of parents to rear their children as they
see fit. 49 There is an undisputed fundamental right of parents to raise their children, 50 but most United States Appeals Courts have held that juvenile curfew
laws do not unduly burden parents. 5' Curfew laws containing exceptions for
when the parent accompanies the child at night, has authorized another adult to
do so, or has signed a written, dated permission slip for the child to be on a specific errand have generally been upheld.5 2 On the other hand, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit struck down one teen curfew on the
ground that it impermissibly infringed on the parent's rights where the only exception to the curfew was if the parent personally accompanied the child during
45
46

See, e.g., Schleifer, 159 F.3d 843.
Id. at 853. The Schleifer court explained:
The Charlottesville ordinance provides an exception for those minors who are
"exercising First Amendment rights protected by the United States Constitution, such as the free exercise of religion, freedom of speech and the right of
assembly." CHARLOTrESVILLE, VA., CODE § 17-7(b)(8). Plaintiffs insist that
this exception accords standardless discretion to law enforcement officers to
decide whether or not the exception applies. According to plaintiffs, it also
forces citizens to learn a complex body of constitutional law in order to comprehend its scope.

Id.
Id. at 854. See also Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 546.
Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 854.
49
Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 540-41; Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 852; Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 496
(5th Cir. 1993); Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 48 F. Supp. 2d 176, 188 (D. Conn. 1999).
50
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
47

48

51
See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 540-41 (holding that the parent's fundamental right to guide the
upbringing of their children was not implicated by the curfew); Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 852 (recognizing that parents do not possess an unqualified right to raise their children); Qutb, 11 F.3d at 496
(holding the statute did not impermissibly infringe on parental rights); Ramos, 48 F. Supp. 2d at
188 (holding that there was no violation of any fundamental rights).
52
See supra note 51.
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curfew hours.53 However, very few curfew laws use this specific language, and
typically survive constitutional challenges brought under this claim.
The most successful constitutional challenges to juvenile curfews,
which will be the focus of this Note, have been that the laws infringe upon the
minor's fundamental right to free movement. Since the beginning of the Twentieth Century, it has been clear that individuals have a fundamental right to interstate travel,54 but the United States Supreme Court has declined to resolve the
5
question of whether or not there is a fundamental right to intrastate travel. 1
The Court has however implied many times in dictum that there is a right to
intrastate travel. 56 As a result, the United States Appeals Courts are split regarding whether this right also encompasses a right to intrastate travel or a right to
free movement and whether that right should extend to minors. Additionally,
there is no definitive ruling on what standard of review should be applied. Here,
the circuits are also split, covering the full spectrum of review standards including rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.57 Even among the
United States Courts of Appeals that have applied the same level of scrutiny, the
courts have reached varying outcomes. 58
C.

CircuitSplit Summary Regarding the FundamentalRight to Free Movement
1.

Strict Scrutiny Circuits

Strict scrutiny, which requires that the law achieve a compelling governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to meet that purpose, is applied to
53
Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 952 (9th Cir. 1997) ("The ordinance does not
allow an adult to pre-approve even a specific activity after curfew hours unless a custodial adult
actually accompanies the minor. Thus, parents cannot allow their children to function independently at night, which some parents may believe is part of the process of growing up.").
54
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759 (1966) ("[Tuhe constitutional right of interstate
travel .. exists. Its explicit recognition .. goes back at least as far as 1904.") (citing United
States v. Moore, 129 F. 630, 633 (1904)).
55
The United States Supreme Court has explicitly declined to even address whether a right to
intrastate travel existed. Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1974).
56
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) ("[Wlandering or strolling" from place to
place was historically part of the "amenities of life."); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405
U.S. 156, 164 (1972); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 745 (1966) (stating that citizens of the
United States "must have the right to pass and repass through every part of [the country] without
interruption, as freely as in [their] own states") (quoting Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 49
(1867)); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 520 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring)
("[Freedom of movement is the very essence of our free society .... Once the right to travel is
curtailed, all other rights suffer ....
); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958) ("Freedom of
Movement is basic in our scheme of values.").
57
See supra note 14.
58
Id.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol109/iss2/9
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laws that impinge upon fundamental rights.5 9 The United States Court
peals for the Fifth Circuit in the 1993 case, Qutb v. Strauss,60 and the
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the 1997 case, Nunez v.
San Diego,6' both recognized that minors have a fundamental right
movement and used strict scrutiny in reviewing the claims.62
a.

of ApUnited
City of
to free

Qutb v. Strauss

In Qutb, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied
strict scrutiny, and upheld the juvenile curfew as constitutional. The city council of Dallas, Texas enacted an ordinance in 1991 which made it a misdemeanor
for persons less than seventeen years of age to be present on city streets or in
public places between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. on week nights and
between 12:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. on weekends.63 The ordinance provided for

many exceptional circumstances such as exceptions for married or emancipated
persons, persons accompanied by a guardian or on an errand approved by a
guardian, travel to or from work, exercise of First Amendment rights, and emergency situations. 64
The court did not rule on whether the right to move about freely is a
fundamental right, but rather assumed that it was for the purposes of their analysis. 65 Applying strict scrutiny, the court indicated that the stated governmental
purpose of "increasing juvenile safety and decreasing juvenile crime" was
clearly a compelling governmental interest, but the court questioned whether the
curfew law was narrowly tailored to meet that purpose.66 "To be narrowly tailored, there must be a nexus between the stated government interest and the
classification created by the ordinance, [such] 'that the means chosen "fit" this
compelling goal .... .. a Although the statistical evidence of nocturnal crime
rates presented at trial did not provide any specific information about juvenile
crime rates,68 the court felt that the data was sufficient to establish the close fit
required by strict scrutiny and held the law to be constitutional. 69 The court also
noted that the exceptions included in the curfew law were evidence that the govNunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 1997); Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d
488, 492 (5th Cir. 1993).
60
11 F.3d 488.
61
114 F.3d 935.
59

63

Qutb, 11 F,3d at 492; Nunez, 114 F.3d at 946-47.
Qutb, 11 F.3d at 490.

64

Id.

65

Id. at 492.

66
68

Id. at 493.
Id. (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)).
Id.

69

Id.

62

67
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ernment was attempting to find the least restrictive means of accomplishing
their goal.7 °
b.

Nunez v. City of San Diego

In Nunez, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied strict scrutiny, and struck down the juvenile curfew at issue as unconstitutional. 7' In 1994, The City Council of San Diego, California resolved to enforce
an ordinance that was enacted in 1947 which made it unlawful for persons less
than eighteen years of age to "loiter, idle, wander, stroll, or play" in a long list
of public places during the hours between 10:00 p.m. and daylight of the next
day. 72 The ordinance provided four exceptions including accompaniment by an
authorized adult, running an errand approved by an authorized adult, returning
home from
a school-sponsored event, or activity required by some legitimate
73
business.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that although age is not a suspect classification, citizens should have a fundamental right to free movement
generally.7 4 The court indicated that minors, like all other citizens, are entitled
to that right.75 However, because the government has "somewhat broad[] authority to regulate the activities of children," the court looked to Belotti v.
Baird76 to determine whether the government had a heightened interest in restricting the freedom of minors more than adults.77 In Belotti, the United States
Supreme Court identified three reasons why the state might have a heightened
interest in restricting minors: "(1) the peculiar vulnerability of children; (2) their
inability to make critical decisions in an informed,
mature manner; and (3) the
78
importance of the parental role in child rearing.,
Applying strict scrutiny, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that
San Diego had a compelling interest in protecting the community from crime
and reducing juvenile crime and juvenile victimization. 79 However, the court
indicated that the law was not narrowly tailored to meet that purpose. 80 Unlike
the court in Qutb, the Nunez court felt that statistical data regarding general nocturnal crime rates were insufficient proof to demonstrate the link between juve70

Id.

71

Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 949 (9th Cir. 1997).

72

Id. at 938, 939.

73

Id. at 938.
Id. at 944.
Id. at 945.

74

75
76

77
78

79

80

443 U.S. 622 (1979).
Nunez, 114 F.3d at 945.
Id. (citing Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634).
Id. at 946-47.
Id. at 949.
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nile crime and victimization and the hours mandated by the curfew, and held the
law to be unconstitutional. 1
2.

Intermediate Scrutiny Circuits

Intermediate scrutiny is a lower standard than strict scrutiny, which requires that the law serve an important governmental purpose and that the means
employed are substantially related to meeting those objectives. 82 Although recognizing that minors may have a fundamental right to movement, three United
States Courts of Appeals have chosen to apply intermediate scrutiny to curfew
laws.83 The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in the 1999
case, Hutchins v. District of Columbia,84 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in the 2003 case, Ramos v. Town of Vernon,85 and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in the 1998 case, Schleifer v. City
86 have all reasoned that a lesser degree of review is required
of Charlottesville,
87
because minors have different vulnerabilities and characteristics than adults.
a.

Hutchins v. District of Columbia

In Hutchins, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the juvenile curfew in question as constitutional under intermediate scrutiny review.88 In 1995, the District of Columbia Council adopted a curfew that
barred unemancipated minors ages sixteen and under from being in a public
place unaccompanied by a responsible adult from 11:00 p.m. on Sunday through
Thursday and midnight on Friday and Saturday until 5:00 a.m. of the next day.89
The ordinance listed numerous specific exceptions including running errands,
interstate travel in a vehicle, employment, emergencies, attending school, religious, or civic functions, and exercising First Amendment rights.9a
A plurality of judges held that the juvenile curfew in question did not
involve a fundamental right. 91 The plurality stated that minors do not possess a
81

Id. at 948-49.

82

Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 180 (2d Cir. 2003); Hutchins v. District of Co-

lumbia, 188 F.3d 531, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc); Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159
F.3d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1998).
83
The Second Circuit, the Fourth Circuit, and the D.C. Circuit.
84
188 F.3d 531.
85
86
87
88

89

90
91

353 F.3d 171.
159 F.3d 843.
See, e.g., Ramos, 353 F.3d at 180; Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 541; Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 847.
Hutchins, 188 F.3d 531.

Id. at 534.
Id. at 534-35.
Id. at 539.
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fundamental right to freedom of movement because: (1) the United States Supreme Court has not specifically held that freedom of movement is a fundamental right; (2) children are always under some form of custody; and (3) the government has broad authority over children's activities.9 2 However, the court
held that even if a fundamental right was implicated,
the ordinance would with93
stand intermediate scrutiny and analyzed it as such.
First, the court interpreted Bellotti to mean that a lesser degree than
strict scrutiny is necessary when the fundamental rights of minors are concerned.94 Applying intermediate scrutiny, the court used three factors to determine whether a substantial relationship existed between the important governmental interest and the curfew: "(1) the factual premises upon which the legislature based its decision, (2) the logical connection the remedy has to the premises, and (3) the scope of the remedy employed., 95 The appellees pointed out
that the statistical evidence and other proof offered in support of the curfew
were over-inclusive and lacked specific data related to times and places of juvenile crime and victimization,96 but the court noted that the legislature does not
need to "prove a precise fit between the nature of the problem and the legislative
remedy - just a substantial relation." 97 Additionally, the court felt that the enumerated exceptions sufficiently narrowed the scope of the curfew. 98 The D.C.
Circuit held the juvenile curfew to be constitutional. 9
b.

Ramos v. Town of Vernon

In Ramos, the Second Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny, and struck
down the juvenile curfew at issue as unconstitutional deciding that it violated
the juveniles' Fourteenth Amendment right to Equal Protection by burdening
their fundamental right to freedom of movement.10° In 1994, the town council
of Vernon, Connecticut enacted a curfew ordinance that made it illegal for persons younger than 18 years of age to "remain, idle, wander, stroll, or play in any
public place or establishment in the [t]own during curfew hours."' 01 The curfew
hours began at 11:00 p.m. on Sunday through Thursday and 12:01 a.m. on Friday and Saturday and ended at 5:00 a.m. of the next day. °2 The council incor92

Id. at 536-39.

93

Id. at 541.

94

Id. (citing Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979)).
Id. at 542.
Id.

95
96

91
98
99
100
101
102

Id. at 543.
Id. at 545.
Id. at 548.
Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 187 (2d Cir. 2003).
Id. at 172.

Id.
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porated into the ordinance several exceptional circumstances, such as the minor
being accompanied by an adult guardian, running an emergency or guardian
approved errand, and traveling to or from
work, school, religious, or organiza03
tion activity with parental permission.1
The Second Circuit has formally recognized that the freedom of movement is a fundamental right, and as such, a restriction of that right would typically receive strict scrutiny analysis.'°4 However, the Second Circuit chose not
to apply strict scrutiny because "youth blindness is not a goal in the allocation of
constitutional rights ....'05 By this the court meant that the minor's immaturity needed to be accounted for when analyzing a minor's constitutional rights.
The court indicated that responsible analysis of minors' constitutional rights
must take into consideration the particular attributes of 0children.
'06 As a result,
7
the Second Circuit chose to apply intermediate scrutiny.
The Second Circuit took a unique approach by stating that the juveniles
must be the direct and primary beneficiaries of an ordinance in order for the law
to be found constitutional. 0 8 The court stated that if the law restricted the
youths' freedom for the benefit of others in the community, the law must be
considered more suspect. 109Following the approach outlined in the D.C. Circuit
in Hutchins, 0 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the means
chosen did not have a close relationship to the state's interest in the youths' welfare."' The proof offered in support of the curfew was insufficient because it
did not pertain to crimes committed during night-time hours, and as a result, the
United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the curfew was
2
unconstitutional. "1
c.

Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville

In Schleifer, the Fourth Circuit upheld a juvenile curfew as constitutional based on intermediate scrutiny review. 1'3In 1997, the city of Charlottes103

id.

104

Id. at 176.

1o5

Id. at 179 (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979)).

106

Id. at 180.

107

Id.
Id. ("Identifying the true beneficiaries of a restriction of this sort is particularly important in

108

assessing both the legitimacy of the government's objectives and the relationship of those objectives to the means employed to achieve them ....If the direct and primary beneficiaries are children, then the constraint on liberty is more likely to pass constitutional muster.").
109 Id. ("[W]hen evidence suggests that a curfew targeting juveniles was passed for the benefit
of others in the community, that law's constitutionality is more suspect.").
110
Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 541-42 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc).
Il Ramos, 353 F.3d at 187.
112
Id.
113 Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 855 (4th Cir. 1998).
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ville, Virginia, enacted a juvenile curfew ordinance that prohibited minors under
age seventeen from remaining in any public place, vehicle, or establishment
during curfew hours. 114 The curfew hours went into effect at 12:01 a.m. on
Monday through Friday, at 1:00 a.m. on Saturday and Sunday, and lifted at 5:00
a.m. of the next morning.'1 5 The ordinance listed numerous specific exceptions
including running errands; interstate travel; employment; emergencies; attending school, religious, or civic functions; and exercising First Amendment
rights. 116
The court recognized that children possess at least qualified rights so the
ordinance should be subject to more than rational basis review, but because
those rights are not coextensive with those of adults, strict scrutiny would not be
appropriate. 17 Applying intermediate scrutiny, the court determined that the
data used in support of the curfew was sufficient evidence to prove that the curfew was narrowly tailored to achieve those ends."18 The court stated that a juvenile curfew is a political issue that should be carefully considered and decided
by a legislature and that courts should not second guess those lawmakers' decisions. 119 The Fourth Circuit upheld the curfew as constitutional. 120
3.

Rational Basis Circuit - Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown

Rational basis, the lowest standard of constitutional review, requires
only that the means chosen by the government to achieve its objective be rationally related to the ends sought. 121 In other words, as long as the means chosen
are not wholly irrational, the law will survive rational basis review. The only
United States Court of Appeals to review juvenile curfews under the rational
basis standard is the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown. 122 In 1975, the Third Circuit affirmed a
decision by the federal district court, which upheld a juvenile curfew based on
rational basis review.123 However, it is important to note that this case was de-

114

Id. at 846.

115

Id.
Id.

116

119

Id. at 847.
Id. at 849-52.
Id. at 850.

120

Id. at 855.

121

See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 n.21 (1997); Reno v. Flores, 507

117

Hs

U.S. 292, 303 (1993).
122
401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975), affTd, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976) (unpublished table
decision).
123
Id. at 1273.
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cided before the establishment of the intermediate level of scrutiny by the
United States Supreme Court' 24 as well as before Bellotti."l 5
III. ANALYSIS
Juvenile Curfews are Not the Answer

A.

1.

The Data Supporting Their Effectiveness are Lacking

As the enforcement and enactment of juvenile curfews across the nation
continues to grow, debates among concerned citizens regarding the efficacy of
the laws will likely grow as well. Many people share the view that keeping kids
1 26
home at night will reduce the amount of juvenile crime and victimization.
This idea is attractive because it is easy to understand, accept, and implement.
However, the reality is more complex. It is not at all clear that juvenile curfews
have any significant impact on juvenile crime and victimization rates. 127 There
are few,
if any, comprehensive national studies on the effectiveness of cur1 28
fews.
There are, however, a few commonly cited local studies. A Detroit
study conducted in 1975 determined that although the city's juvenile curfew
suppressed some crime during curfew hours, there was also a corresponding
displacement of crime. 129 The crimes still occurred, but they were shifted into
the daytime non-curfew hours. 30 In 1998, another study examining California
juvenile curfews concluded that enforcement of the curfews had no impact on
youth crime and victimization rates.13 ' These reports in combination with a
variety of other factors contribute to the arguments made by curfew opponents.
Although the two reports indicate that juvenile curfews are ineffective, proponents of juvenile curfews can also cite instances where juvenile curfews have
appeared to curb youth victimization and crime.' 32 A 1996 study conducted in
the state of Washington examined the effectiveness of various juvenile curfews
1 33
by surveying city officials of the towns that had enacted curfew ordinances.
The results indicated that most of the cities felt that the ordinances had been

129

See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny for the first time).
443 U.S. 622 (1979).
See Bannister, supra note 3, at 4.
Id.
See Norton, supra note 2, at 193.
See Bannister, supra note 3, at 6.

130

Id.

124
125
126
127
128

131 Id.

See Juvenile Curfews, supra note 1, at 2405-06.
Peggy Slavick & Steve Aos, Juvenile Curfew and Parental Responsibility Ordinances,
Washington State Institute for Public Policy, 3 (1996), available at http//www.wsipp.wa.gov/
rptfiles/JuvCurfew.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2006).
132

133

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2019

15

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 109, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 9

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 109

effective in reducing juvenile victimization and crime. 134 Although a standardized statistical comparison was not conducted, of the twenty-seven Washington
cities surveyed, forty-eight percent stated that their curfews resulted in a reduction in juvenile crime, twenty-two percent stated that there was no impact, and
thirty percent 3stated
that they did not know whether there was an impact on ju5
venile crime.
It is important to recognize that it is very easy for parties on either side
of the issue to manipulate and distort the implications of these types of studies
or to discredit the outcomes. Statistical analysis of the need for and efficacy of
juvenile curfews can be muddled by other factors and can be subjected to potential bias of the persons collecting or reporting the data. Numerous changes may
occur in a community that could result in an increase or decrease in crime,
skewing results. Researchers must consider factors such as changes in the overall crime rates, creation or breakdown of social programs directed at youth, existence of recreational centers, and changes in management or operation of the
police force. 136 Furthermore, data regarding the ages of the juveniles committing the crimes and the times and locations of the occurrences must also be collected and reported in order to conduct a reasonably reliable analysis. Given the
multitude of influential and distorting factors, it is easy to understand why so
few studies are conducted and why it is so difficult to get a complete picture of
the impact of juvenile curfews.
2.

The Reality of Juvenile Curfews

Three explicit policy goals are commonly cited by the local government
when enacting juvenile curfews: 1) reducing juvenile crime, 2) preventing harm
to minors, and 3) increasing parental responsibility. 137 While these are unquestionably important goals, juvenile curfews are not necessarily the best approach
to achieving them. The first goal, reducing juvenile crime, is not very well
served because logically only a small percentage of juvenile crime would occur
during the night-time hours when the overwhelming majority of minors are
sleeping. Because some studies have shown that 3:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. is the
time of day when most juvenile crime occurs, night-time curfews could only
have a minor impact on the overall rates of juvenile crime. 138 Additionally, the
sort of teens that would commit the types of violent nocturnal crimes that the
curfews seek to prevent are not likely to be deterred by the relatively small fines

134

Id.

135

Id. at 3-4.

136

See Norton, supra note 2, at 194.

See, e.g., Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 181 (2d Cir. 2003); Nunez v. City of
San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 1997).
138
See Norton, supra note 2, at 194.
137
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and penalties of the curfew when they would have
been willing to risk punish139
ment for the more serious crime in the first place.
The second goal, preventing harm to minors, might actually be hindered
if children who are victimized by family members are forced to stay in their
house at night with an abusive or substance dependant parent.140 Child victimization, such as sexual, physical, and emotional abuse, occurs most frequently at
home. 141 Finally, achievement of the third goal, increasing parental responsibility, is debatable at best. Some may presume that parental responsibility is increased by forcing parents restrict their children's boundaries. However, some
parents may believe that a youth's maturity and responsible decision making
skills are best developed by giving the child limited freedom and personal
autonomy. 142 It seems counterintuitive that removing a parent's authority would
achieve the third goal of increasing parental responsibility.
Because the laws appear to be only loosely correlated to the three stated
goals discussed above, a person may suspect that certain unstated goals for enacting juvenile curfews exist. In reality, curfews are likely a "knee-jerk reaction" by politicians in response to community fears. 143 Due to generation gaps,
which have always been present throughout the ages in all societies, many
adults are afraid of youths. 4 Today, in our society, "to be young is to be suspect., 145 This perception is unfortunate because many young persons are law
abiding citizens who want to make positive contributions to their communities
and families.1 46 However, isolated cases of youth violence frequently receive
extensive coverage by the media because they are shocking and disturbing.
When people hear about such senseless youth violence and incidents of young
lives lost on the news, they demand action from their law makers. 147 Degenerate
kids roaming the streets at night in search of trouble has become a common image in our collective fears. 148 Consequently, minors then become the target of
ineffective laws that potentially violate their constitutional rights because of the
Jordan C. Budd, Juvenile Curfews: The Rights of Minors vs. the Rhetoric of Public Safety,
HUMAN RIGHTS, Fall 1999, available at www.abanet.org/irr/hr/fal199humanrights/budd.html (last
visited Mar. 2, 2006).
139

140

Id.

See Norton, supra note 2, at 194.
See, e.g., Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 496 (5th Cir. 1993) (One parent felt the juvenile
curfew in question "would... deprive her daughter of the opportunity to learn to manage her time
and make decisions before going away to college.").
143 Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 187 (2d Cir. 2003).
144
Annette Fuentes, The Crackdown on Kids: The New Mood of Meanness Toward ChildrenTo be Young is to be Suspect, THE NATION, June 15, 1998, at 20-23.
145
Id.
146 See Budd, supra note 139.
147 See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1.
141
142

148

Id.
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actions of a few bad actors. Juvenile curfew laws are "ineffectual posturing and
pandering-at the expense of the civil rights of young people ....
Minority and poor children suffer the most from juvenile curfews. Minority youths are disproportionately affected because the police most frequently
stop black and Hispanic youths assuming that they are likely gang members. 150
Poor children are also disproportionately affected because they have evening
jobs more often than wealthier children and have to risk being stopped more
often. 151Also, many poor families in urban areas do not have basements, yards,
or porches where children typically play. 152 Additionally, some disadvantaged
kids may simply want to get away from a bad home life.
3.

A Less Restrictive Approach to Reducing Juvenile Crime
Should be Adopted

If the proponents of curfews truly want to achieve the express policy
goals of reducing juvenile crime and victimization, programs should be implemented that are actually likely to achieve those goals. Rather than passing ordinances that could potentially violate youths' rights, it makes more sense to generate proactive solutions. There are many options that are likely to be at least as
effective at reducing juvenile crime and victimization such as school based programs, supervised recreation, employment opportunities, anti-gang programs,
youth gun violence reduction programs, and other intervention programs. In
order to be successful, the design of social programming needs to target the age
groups and neighborhoods that are the source of the community's problems and
encourage involvement of families, schools, and communities. The costs of
these options can be high and the impact may be questionable and difficult to
assess, but the same problems exist regarding the cost and impact of juvenile
curfews. 153 Although the cost and effectiveness of all the available options are
problematic, only one option appears to restrict the rights of the persons it purports to help.
B.

The ConstitutionalAnalysis of Juvenile Curfews That Should be
Adopted

Because the United States Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue, the
approach taken to analyze the constitutionality of juvenile curfews is currently
divided across the circuits. '4 The circuits are split over not only the definition
149 Sale ex rel. Sale v. Goldman, 539 S.E.2d 446, 460 (W. Va.2000) (Starcher, J., dissenting).
150
151
152
153
154

See Norton, supra note 2, at 193; Juvenile Curfews, supra note 1, at 2404.
See Norton, supra note 2, at 195; Juvenile Curfews, supra note 1, at 2404.
See Norton, supra note 2, at 195.
See supra Part IL A. 1.
See supra Part ILC.
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of the right to freedom of movement, the fundamentality of the right, and the
extension of the right to minors, but also what the appropriate standard of review should be, what impact Bellotti should have on the analysis, and how
closely related the means must be to the ends under each standard of review.
The Supreme Court has not given clear guidance on many of these questions
embedded in the analysis, leaving the circuits broad leeway for divergent interpretations.
1.

Defining and Classifying the Right at Issue
a.

Freedom of Movement is a FundamentalRight

It is well established that people have the fundamental right to interstate
travel.1 Although not expressly defined in the text of the Constitution, the
United States Supreme Court has stated that the right to travel is a "privilege
and immunity of national citizenship under the Constitution,"'' 56 as well as a
"part of the 'liberty' of which the citizen cannot be deprived without the due
process of law ....
Unfortunately, the existence of a fundamental right to
intrastate travel, or freedom of movement generally, is less certain. The Supreme Court has not expressly stated whether the right of freedom of movement
is a fundamental right, but it has implied many times in dictum that it is.158 It
seems intuitive that if people have the fundamental right to movement between
states, then they should also possess the right to move freely within their own
state. After all, what is "liberty" if not the freedom to move from place to
place? In United States v. Wheeler,159 the Court stated, "In all the states ... the
55

155 See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 510 (1999) (invalidating a statute limiting the maximum welfare benefits available to newly arrived residents because it burdened the fundamental
right to interstate travel); Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 269 (1974) (invalidating a one-year residency requirement in a county as a condition of receiving free non-emergency
hospitalization or medical care because it burdened the fundamental right to interstate travel);
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 359 (1972) (invalidating a one-year in state residency requirement for voting because it burdened the fundamental right to interstate travel); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969) (invalidating a law denying welfare benefits to new state residents
until they had resided in the state for at least a year because it burdened the fundamental right to
interstate travel); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759 (1966).
156
Guest, 383 U.S. at 764 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C.C. 371
(1825)). See also U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
157 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958).
158
See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,
405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972) ("[W]andering or strolling" from place to place was historically part of
the "amenities of life."); Guest, 383 U.S. at 758 (1966) (stating that citizens of the United States
"must have the right to pass and repass through every part of [the country] without interruption, as
freely as in [their] own states" (quoting Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 49 (1867)); Aptheker v.
Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 520 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[F]reedom of movement is
the very essence of our free society ....Once the right to travel is curtailed, all other rights suffer
....
");Kent, 357 U.S. at 126 ("Freedom of Movement is basic in our scheme of values.").
159 254 U.S. 281 (1920).
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citizens thereof possess[] the fundamental right, inherent in citizens of all free
governments, peacefully to dwell within the limits of their respective states, to
move at will from place to place therein, and to have free ingress thereto and
egress therefrom.. . . "160 When the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the appeal of the Bykofsky case, the Third Circuit case that upheld a lower court's decision to preserve a juvenile curfew under rational basis scrutiny, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a strong dissent stating that freedom of movement is a fundamental right and that the Supreme Court should review the case under strict
scrutiny to determine whether juvenile curfews curtail that right. 161 Although it
is not absolutely certain, most circuits have concluded that a fundamental right
to freedom of movement exists. 162
The first step in analyzing juvenile curfews is defining the specific right
at issue. Because the freedom of movement is an unenumerated right, there is
disagreement over the definition of the right and the degree of generality or
specificity with which the right should be stated. For example, in Hutchins, the
D.C. Circuit defined the right at issue narrowly as a minor's right to be on the
streets at night without adult supervision. 163 As another example, in Nunez, the
Ninth Circuit defined the right at issue broadly as every citizen's fundamental
right to the freedom of movement.164 In Washington v. Glucksburg,165 the
United States Supreme Court stated that a "careful description" of the asserted
fundamental right is required. 166 This implies some undetermined degree of
specificity, but courts must be careful not to "defin[e] the right as the mirror
image of the particular burden ...."167 Because the degree of specificity with
which the right in question must be defined is entirely within the discretion of
the court, it is possible that the court's choice of definition will be influenced by
its own personal views of the underlying conduct.168 With respect to a minor's
right to freedom of movement, a court must be careful not to define the right too
160

Id. at 293 (emphasis added).

161

Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 429 U.S. 964, 964-65 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissent-

ing).
162 See, e.g., Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 176 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating the right to
freedom of movement has been recognized in this circuit); Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d
935, 944 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that citizens have a fundamental right to free movement); and
Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1254 (M.D. Pa. 1975), affd, 535 F.2d
1245 (3d Cir. 1976) (unpublished table decision) (stating that the right of freedom of movement is
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). But see Hutchins v. District
of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc) (stating that the Supreme Court has
only indicated in dicta that a freedom of movement might exist while they were examining other
issues).
163
188 F.3d at 538.
164
114 F.3d at 944.
165
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
166

Id. at 703 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).

167

Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 554 (Rogers, J., dissenting).

168

Id. at 556.
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narrowly by reading their individual beliefs into the Constitution instead of interpreting it. The right at issue in juvenile curfew cases should be simply the
right of freedom of movement.
b.

The FundamentalRight of Freedom of Movement
Should be Extended to Minors

Once a court has determined that the freedom of movement is a fundamental right, it must then determine whether that right extends to minors. Many
of the circuits have decided that children do possess a fundamental right to freedom of movement, but some circuits have stated that they do not possess the
right to the same extent as adults. 169 The circuits that have held that children
posses only a reduced right to freedom of movement, or deny that children possess this right at all, frequently rely on the Supreme Court's statement in Prince
v. Massachusetts170 that "the state's authority over children's activities is
broader than over like actions of adults."' 71 In Prince, the United States Supreme Court sustained the conviction of a woman who took her nine-year-old
niece with her to help sell religious material in the evening. 172 The Court determined that the state had a strong interest in protecting the child from psychological and physical harm. 173 Reliance on this precedent is misplaced because
the Court was careful to state that its decision should not be extended beyond
the facts of that particular case. 74 Additionally, since Prince, the Supreme
Court has limited the application of that case to situations where a "substantial
threat" of harm exists to the "physical' 75or mental health of the child or to the
public safety, peace, order, or welfare."'
Cases denying a minor's unqualified right to freedom of movement also
frequently cite Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton. 176 In Vernonia, the
United States Supreme Court held that "[tiraditionally at common law, and still
today, unemancipated minors lack some of the most fundamental rights of selfdetermination - including even the right of liberty in its narrow sense, [for ex169

See Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 177-78 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that the exis-

tence of rights is not based on age); Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 847 (4th
Cir. 1998) (stating that children do possess at least a qualified right to freedom of movement);
Nunez, 114 F.3d at 945 (declining to hold that the Constitution does not secure minors' fundamental rights). But see Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 539 (stating that although adults may possess freedom of movement, children do not).
170 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
171
Id. at 168.
172
Id. at 161-62, 171.
173
Id. at 169-70.
174 Id. at 171; Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 862 (Michaels, J., dissenting).
175 Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 862 (Michaels, J., dissenting) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.

205, 230 (1972)).
176
515 U.S. 646 (1995).
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Using this authority is misleading

because the statement is taken out of context. 78 The Vernonia Court went on to
explain in the next sentence that children "are subject, even as to their physical
freedom, to the control of their parents or guardians."' 179 Courts should not extend this case to mean that minors are always automatically subject to broad
authority of the state beyond the extent that the state has control over their parents. 180 The Supreme Court has held that the state may regulate children to a
greater extent than adults, but this does not mean that the state can easily trump
parental authority. 181 "The state's power to displace parental discretion is limited, however, and must be justified on a case-by-case basis .

. .

. [E]xcept in

special circumstances, the state
'' normally must defer to the exercise of a broad
degree of parental discretion.

182

In order for the state to regulate children to a

greater extent than adults, there must be a significant state interest that is present
in the case of minors that is not present for adults. 183 In other words, if the
streets are dangerous at night, it is so for both minors and adults, and the crimes
committed at night may be perpetrated by both minors and adults.
When identifying fundamental rights, the Court "has neither rested on
any single textual basis nor expressed a consistent theory."' 84 However, the
Court has often relied on an examination of America's history and tradition to
find such rights. For example, in Washington v. Glucksberg, 85 when determining the fundamentality of a right, the United States Supreme Court held that "the
177

Id. at 654.

178

Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 944 (1997).

179

515 U.S. at 654.
Nunez, 114 F.3d at 944-45.
181
See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265, (1984) (the state may trump parental discretion in
delinquency proceedings because parental control has already faltered); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S.
584, 603 (1979) (the state may also trump parental control where a child's "physical or mental
health is jeopardized").
182
Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 861 (4th Cir. 1998) (Michaels, J., dissent180

ing).
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976). The court stated:
Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when
one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are
protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights . . . . The
Court indeed, however, long has recognized that the State has somewhat
broader authority to regulate the activities of children than adults .... It remains, then, to examine whether there is any significant state interest in [the
effect of the statute] that is not present in the case of an adult.
Id. See also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636-37, 643 (1968) (upholding prohibition on
pornography sales to minors and stating that the state may restrict minors' rights more than adults'
rights).
184
Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494,503 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
185
183
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Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties
which are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' ...
and 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor
Juvenile curfews have been
justice would exist if they were sacrificed ....
used in the United States for over a century, 87 but this fact alone should be insufficient to deny the existence of a minor's right to freedom of movement.
Liberty and justice are not served by imposing such restrictions on minors.
Some children may not have sufficient maturity or knowledge to exercise their
fundamental rights, but this is the reason why children are subject to the control
of their parents.
Age should not be a factor used to define the right at issue. 88 Children
may have less ability to assert or appreciate their constitutional liberties, but
their rights are no less important. The United States Supreme Court has repeat-89
edly held or implied that juveniles possess unqualified constitutional rights.
On many occasions, the Court has made it clear that youths are entitled to all of
the rights and protections afforded by the Constitution and Bill of Rights. 90 It
would be inconsistent to say that juveniles possess the fundamental rights of
freedom of religion, freedom of speech, due process, and equal protection, but
not freedom of movement. While the state may regulate children to a greater
extent than adults,' 9' these considerations should come into play only when
justifying the state's interest and not when determining the fundamentality of a
right.

186 Id. at 720-21 (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 503; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26
(1937)).
187 See Curfew Ordinances,supra note 19, at 66 n.5.
188 Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 555 (1999) (en banc) (Rodgers, dissenting
and concurring).
189 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223-24 (1982) (equal protection); Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565, 581-82 (1975) (due process); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 17-18 (1975) (equal protection); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-68 (1970) (due process); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (speech rights); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13, 28
(1967) (due process and other criminal procedural rights); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
493-94 (1954) (equal protection); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
(speech and religion rights).
190
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633, (1979) (four-vote plurality opinion) ("A child, merely
on account of his minority, is not beyond the protection of the Constitution."); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) ("Minors, as well as adults, are protected
by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights."); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511, (1969) ("Students
... are 'persons' under our Constitution [who] are possessed of fundamental rights which the
State must respect."); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13, (1967) ("whatever may be their precise impact,
neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone"). See also Breed v.
Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
191 See supra note 183.
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Standard of Review
a.

RationalBasis is not the AppropriateStandardof Review

The courts that have analyzed the constitutionality of juvenile curfews
under rational basis review have premised the appropriateness of this standard
on their opinions that the relevant interest in question is not a fundamental
right. 192 This view results when the court defines the right so narrowly that it
can no longer be classified as fundamental. 193 If courts were allowed to define
all rights based on the specific circumstances of every case, many of the rights
that we possess as citizens under the Constitution could be restrained by the
judiciary depending on the judges' own personal views. 194 This is not to say
that every right should be defined in the broadest terms possible, but rather that
the definition of the right must be broad enough that it does not obscure the
fundamentality of the right at issue. The relevant interest in juvenile curfew
cases should not be defined any more narrowly than a juvenile's right to the
freedom of movement subject to their parent's control. It seems wrong to review infringement of the right to freedom of movement under the lowest degree
of scrutiny when there is evidence to support the assertion that it is a fundamental right.'95 An ordinance that restricts liberty to such an extent should196be subject to a heightened degree of scrutiny rather than rational basis review.
b.

Intermediate Scrutiny is not the Appropriate Standard
of Review

Although recognizing that minors may have a fundamental right to
movement, the Second, Fourth, and D.C. Circuits have chosen to apply intermediate scrutiny. 97 Relying heavily on Bellotti v. Baird,198 these circuits have all
reasoned that a lesser degree of review is required because youths have different
vulnerabilities and characteristics than adults. 199 In the 1979 plurality opinion of
Bellotti, the United States Supreme Court established new guidelines for analyz192
Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 176 (2d Cir. 2003). The opinion explains that the
courts that have used rational basis review to analyze the Constitutionality of juvenile curfews
have "defin[ed] the relevant interest so narrowly that it is not deemed a constitutional right and
heightened scrutiny does not come into play." Id.
193
Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 542 (defining the right at issue narrowly as juveniles' "right to be on
the streets at night without adult supervision").
194
See supra Part UI.B.I.a.
195
See supra notes 158-162 and accompanying text.
196
Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1998).
197
Ramos, 353 F.3d 171; Hutchins, 188 F.3d 531; Schleifer, 159 F.3d 843.
198

443 U.S. 622 (1979).

199

See, e.g., Ramos, 353 F.3d at 176-8 1; Hutchins, 188 F.3d 531; Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 847.
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ing juveniles' rights when it reviewed a Massachusetts statute that required a
minor to obtain parental consent in order to have an abortion. 20° The Court set
forth three specific factors that should be considered when analyzing the constitutional rights of minors to determine whether a different analysis should be
applied for minors than would be for adults. 20 1 As stated in Bellotti:
The Court has long recognized that the status of minors under
the law is unique in many respects . . . .We have recognized
three reasons justifying the conclusion that the constitutional
rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults: the
peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical
decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of
the parental role in child rearing. 20 2
The three factor Bellotti Test should not be construed to provide reasons
that always justify greater restrictions on minors than adults, and, more importantly, it should not be read to establish a lower level of scrutiny for the constitutional rights of minors.20 3 Instead, Bellotti provides courts with a framework
that they can use to determine whether the state has a sufficiently important or
compelling interest that would justify imposition of greater restrictions on minors than on adults with respect to the right at issue. 2°4 The courts that have
interpreted Bellotti to mean that a lesser degree than strict scrutiny is appropriate
when these factors are applicable are using the factors improperly. Worse yet,
these intermediate scrutiny cases are double counting the factors by using them
once to lower the standard from strict to intermediate scrutiny, and then using
them again in the argument justifying the state's important interest. The Bellotti
factors should not be used for both determining the right at issue and justifying
the states interests, but rather, they should only be used to analyze the state's
interest.
In 2003, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
chose to analyze a constitutional challenge to a juvenile curfew under intermediate scrutiny stating that youth-blindness is not a constitutional goal.205 The
Second Circuit stated that "strict scrutiny ... embodies a constitutional preference for blindness ....[and] reflects the notion that some rights are so important that they should be afforded to individuals in a manner blind to all group
classifications, absent the most compelling reason to do otherwise." 206 The
200

Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 624-26.

201

Id. at 634.
Id.

202

205

Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 945-46 (1997).
Id.
Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 179 (2d Cir. 2003).

206

Id.

203
204
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court implied that youth-blindness must be avoided because inherent mental and
physical differences between adults and children raise concerns about minors'
vulnerability and inexperience. 2°7 Although the Second Circuit did not indicate
that they were using the Bellotti factors to reduce the level of scrutiny, their reasons for reducing the level of scrutiny are embodied in the first two factors of
the Bellotti test. 20 8 However, by applying the Bellotti factors when analyzing
the state's interest, these concerns would have been addressed, and the court's
goal of avoiding youth-blindness would have been achieved.
c.

Strict Scrutiny is the Appropriate Standardof Review

Freedom of movement is a fundamental right, and under traditional constitutional analysis, an ordinance restricting a fundamental right should be reviewed under strict scrutiny. 2°9 Although there has a broad range of standards
used among the circuits, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have decided that strict
scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review. 210 Minors must be treated the
same as adults whenever the government lacks interests specific to minors to
support more restrictive regulatory authority over them. 21' It can be deducted
from this that the standard of review for a law that intrudes upon a fundamental
right is strict scrutiny regardless of whether the person whose rights have been
violated is a minor or an adult.
All fundamental rights should begin with analysis under strict scrutiny; 212 however, when interests specific to minors exist the government's claim
for restrictions on minors is much stronger.2 3 As the Court stated in Planned
Parenthoodof CentralMissouri v. Danforth:
Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority.
Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and
possess constitutional rights. The Court indeed, however, long
has recognized that the State has somewhat broader authority to
regulate the activities of children than of adults. It remains,
then, to examine whether there is any significant state interest in

W7

Id. at 179-80.
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (points used in Bellotti factors one and two).
W9
Att'y General of New York v. Sato-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 906 (1986); see also Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
210
Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 945-47 (9th Cir. 1997); Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d
2W

488, 492 (5th Cir. 1993).
211
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976).
212
See cases cited supra note 209.
213
Qutb, 11 F.3d at 492 n.6; Nunez, 114 F.3d 945.
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conditioning an abortion on the consent of a parent or person in
loco parentis that is not present in the case of an adult.
If there are concerns specific to minors that indicate that the state must
regulate minors in a more severe manner than would be permissible for adults,
then the Bellotti factors should be used to determine the strength of the state's
compelling interest under strict scrutiny analysis. This creates a more principled
approach for deciding whether children can be treated differently than adults,
rather than categorically applying intermediate scrutiny to all cases involving
minors' rights. 21 It would be wrong to allow juveniles to be deprived of constitutional rights even when the government has no justification specific to minors
and where similar deprivations would be intolerable for adults.21 6
3.

Analyzing Juvenile Curfews under Strict Scrutiny

Now that the right of freedom of movement has been defined and classified as fundamental, 21 7 and the standard of review has been determined,21 8 the
next step is to apply the standard to the right. Although strict scrutiny seems to
be the most appropriate standard of review, it is largely irrelevant whether strict
or intermediate scrutiny is applied because most juvenile curfews should not
stand under either level of review. In order to withstand strict scrutiny analysis,
the government must show that the statute achieves a compelling governmental
interest and that it is narrowly tailored to meet that purpose. 219 To withstand
intermediate scrutiny analysis, the government must show that the statute serves
an important governmental purpose and that the means employed are substantially relatedto meeting those objectives. 220 Although strict scrutiny should be
used to analyze juvenile curfews, this Article will apply intermediate scrutiny to
demonstrate that these ordinances should not stand even under the less stringent
standard.
Three explicit policy interests commonly cited by local governments
when enacting juvenile curfews include reducing juvenile crime, preventing
harm to minors, and increasing parental responsibility. 22' The first step in applying the standard is determining whether these interests are sufficiently impor-

215

Planned Parenthood,428 U.S. at 74-75 (citations omitted).
Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 865 (4th Cir. 1998) (Michael dissenting).

216

Id. at 864.

217

See supra Part Il1.B. 1.
See supra Part L.B.2.
See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.

214

218
219

535, 541 (1942).
220
See, e.g., Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 176-81 (2d Cir. 2003); Hutchins v.
District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc); Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 847.
221
See, e.g., Ramos, 353 F.3d at 181; Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir.
1997).
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tant. It is undisputable that the government's goals are important. The next step
in applying the standard is determining whether juvenile curfews are substantially related to achieving those goals. The Bellotti factors should be used at this
point to decide whether the government's interests justify a differential analysis
for minors' rights. These factors are: (1) the peculiar vulnerability of children;
(2) their inability to make critical decisions in an informed,
mature manner; and
222
(3) the importance of the parental role in child rearing.
The first factor, the peculiar vulnerability of children, requires that there
be a real danger to which children are particularly susceptible. 223 Crime impacts
all of society, but there should be some evidence that suggests minors are more
likely to be affected by it than any other group. Bellotti requires a realistic appraisal on a case by case basis to determine whether minors are in fact disproportionately at risk to commit crimes or become the victims of crime.22 It has
been argued by some that this standard is too high because the evidence needed
to prove that a real danger is present is exceptionally difficult to obtain. 225
While this may be true, the state should at least be required to try to make an
objective inquiry as to whether a real danger exists for children before depriving
them of a fundamental right. Although scientifically certain statistics are not
required,226 courts should demand more than paternal assumptions, intuition,
and stereotypes. Additionally, if a real provable danger to children during the
nighttime hours did in fact exist, the vast majority of parents would not even
consider allowing their children to be out alone on the streets at night, nor would
children want to be there.
The second Bellotti factor, children's inability to make critical decisions
in an informed, mature manner, requires that the state have an interest in limiting minors' right to make "important, affirmative choices with potentially serious consequences. 2 27 The choices implicated by juvenile curfews are not seri
2 8 The decision to either stay inside or roam at night
ous, critical decisions. 228
222

Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).

M3
See, e.g., Ramos, 353 F.3d at 186 ("Significantly, the survey results do not identify any
hours as particularly dangerous, and they do not indicate that the schoolchildren themselves are
the source of the problem or any more likely than adults to be victims. We see no direct connection therefore between the survey results and the curfew.") (emphasis in original); Schleifer, 159
F.3d at 849 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664, (1994)) ("[T]he government 'must do more than simply "posit the existence of the disease sought to be cured." It
must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation
will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way."').
224

Susan M. Horowitz, A Search for Constitutional Standards: Judicial Review of Juvenile

Curfew Ordinances,24 COLuM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 381,412 (1991).
225 See Juvenile Curfews, supra note 1, at 2419.
2M Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641 (1968) (citing Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219
U.S. 104, 110 (1911)).
227 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635.
2n Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976) (examining a minor's
right to have an abortion).
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simply does not present the type of profound decision which Bellotti would
leave to the state. 229 The decision at issue is not whether to engage in crime, but
whether to remain in public at night. This decision is much less serious than
weighing the life-altering consequences surrounding the choice to abort a pregnancy, as was the case in Bellotti.23 °
The third factor, the importance of the parental role in child rearing, favors laws that foster the parent-child relationship. 231 The Bellotti Court stated
that the intention of this third factor is to support, rather than supplant the
choices parents make in raising their children. 23 The "importance of the parental role in child-rearing" may be promoted by legal restrictions "especially...
supportive of the parental role" in preparing children for responsible adulthood.233 When the issue involves only a parent's authority over their children's
general activities, the parental role is protected against the exercise of state
power.2 4 On the contrary, juvenile curfews undermine parental control by interfering with the parent's decisions about how to prepare their children for
adulthood. Some parents may feel it is important to allow their children to go
see a late movie and have a late dinner with friends on special occasions in order
to reward them and to help the child develop mature decision making skills.
Restricting the parental. role in this manner actually has the opposite effect of the
intent of the third Bellotti factor.
The stated policy reasons behind juvenile curfews are legitimate concerns; however, it is not clear that the means employed are likely to be substantially related to achieving the goals. Although every case must be reviewed on
an individual basis, it is difficult to see how any child curfew law could pass
constitutional muster unless the state could provide support for the contention
that a real danger, specific to children, exists on the streets during curfew hours.
Under this analysis, most juvenile curfew laws would be struck down as unconstitutional.

229

Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 942 F. Supp. 665, 673-74 (D.D.C. 1996); Waters v. Barry,

711 F. Supp. 1125, 1137 (D.D.C. 1989); McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381, 138586 (D.C.N.H. 1984); Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1073 (5thCir. 1981).
230
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
231
See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 637-39.
232 Id. at 638 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("[Ilt is cardinal with us
that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparationfor obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.") (em-

phasis in original).
233 Id. at 634, 638-39.
2U
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (announcing that parents have the primary
role in regulating the activities of their children).
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IV. JUVENILE CURFEWS AND WEST VIRGINIA

A.

235
Sale ex rel. Sale v. Goldman

In 1997, the Charleston city council enacted a "Youth Protection Ordinance" with the purpose
of preventing juvenile victimization and exposure to
236
criminal activity.
The ordinance imposed a curfew on persons under the age
of eighteen beginning at 10:00 p.m. on Sunday through Thursday nights and
237
12:01 a.m. on Friday and Saturday nights until 6:00 a.m. of the next morning.
The list of exceptions in the ordinance includes emergencies, employment,
emancipated children, accompaniment by a parent, running errands, exercising
First Amendment rights, attending school, religious, or civic functions, and
permission from a parent for special circumstances.23 8 The Sales challenged the
curfew on various grounds, and the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
upheld Charleston's juvenile curfew as constitutional.239
The court recognized freedom of movement as a fundamental right, but
declined to extend that right to minors.24 Agreeing with the Hutchin24 court,
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals referenced the portion of the
analysis from that decision which noted that children are always in some form
of custody and that juvenile curfews are deeply rooted in our nation's history
and traditions. 242 Based on these principals, the court declined to evaluate the
ordinance under strict scrutiny and decided instead to use rational basis review. 243 Applying rational basis, the court felt that the data used by the city to
support the curfew was sufficient to establish that the law was rationally related
to the city's legitimate interest in its children's welfare. 244
The first problem with the court's analysis is its failure to recognize that
minors possess the fundamental right to freedom of movement. As stated previously, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that children
are entitled to the same rights and protections that the Constitution affords
adults, 24524even if it must be limited based on the Bellotti factors. 4 The second
problem with the court's analysis is its choice of standard of review. Referenc235

539 S.E.2d 446 (W. Va. 2000).

236

CHARLESTON, W. VA., CODE, supra note 7.

237

Sale, 539 S.E.2d at 449.

238

Id. at 450.

239

Id. at 450, 460.

240
241

Id. at 455.
Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc).

242

Sale, 539 S.E.2d at 455.

243

Id. at 456.

244

Id. at 457.

245

See supra notes 189-190.

246

Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
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ing the analysis of the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in
Hutchins, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals took its decision one
step beyond the loose treatment by the D.C. Circuit and chose to apply the rational basis standard of review.247 This is even more unusual considering West
Virginia lies within the fourth circuit, and chose not to apply the intermediate
scrutiny review used by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Schleifer.2 It is disconcerting that so many circuits, including the fourth
circuit, have used the Bellotti factors to reduce the degree of scrutiny from strict
to intermediate, but it is even more concerning that the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals would simply declare that minors do not possess fundamental
rights and review the ordinance under rational basis.2 49 Since the United States
Supreme Court established the intermediate scrutiny standard of review in
1976,250 all of the Circuit Courts of Appeals that have reviewed juvenile curfew
cases have analyzed the issue under at least intermediate scrutiny analysis.25 ' In
Justice Starcher's dissent, he comments that the court's abandonment of strict
scrutiny analysis is an inexplicable and unnecessary derogation of the rights of
West Virginia's youth. 5 2 He also expressed his distaste over the way the youth
of West Virginia are being "scapegoat[ed]
and stigmatize[d] . . .for the larger
253
shortcomings of our society.,
B.

The Continuing Impact in West Virginia

In light of the support provided by the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals, West Virginia cities have continued to enact and modify existing juvenile curfew laws that mirror the Charleston ordinance. 254 One example is the
juvenile curfew passed in Huntington, West Virginia in September of 2005.5 5
In May of that year, four people ages sixteen to nineteen where shot and killed
in the early morning hours after a Huntington high school prom.256 The
neighborhood where the shooting took place has a history of incidents of violent
crime and illegal drug activity.5 7 In response, the residents of the neighborhood
247 Sale, 539 S.E.2d at 456.
248

Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 849-52 (4th Cir. 1998).

249 Sale, 539 S.E.2d at 455-56.
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the first time in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
251
See supra notes 59-120 and accompanying text.
252
Sale, 539 S.E.2d at 460 (Starcher, J.,
dissenting).
253 Id.
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2005, at 2A.
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where the shooting occurred began lobbying for a strengthened juvenile curfew
in an effort to curb violent crime in the area. 8 Based on the Charleston curfew
that was approved by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, the Huntington city council passed the ordinance by a vote of 6 to 5.259 Although the city
council was aware that the Charleston curfew has been largely unenforced and
ineffective, the members supported and passed the curfew.2 6 As is the case in
most similar circumstances, the city felt that it had to do something to appease
the public, and passing a law "doesn't cost the city any money . .. and the
community feels like something has been accomplished., 2 6' Unfortunately, it is
a solution that will likely be ineffective and impinge upon the rights of minors.
The new ordinance provides the typical exceptions listed in juvenile
curfew laws and states that parents and guardians may be charged with a misdemeanor if they knowingly permit their child to violate the curfew. 262 The law
also state that anyone who assists in the violation may be fined or placed in jail
for two days.263 Parents, even single moms who must trust their children while
working evening jobs, can face jail time for their child's curfew violation 264
Also, business proprietors, who can only guess the ages of their patrons, face the
same penalties for allowing minors to remain at their establishment beyond curfew hours.2 65 Although the new Huntington ordinance is not likely to be enforced over the long run, good kids who want to make sure they do not get into
trouble may end up staying at home, missing cultural events and opportunities to
socialize with their friends. Despite the long list of exceptions to the ordinance, 266 many law-abiding minors will fear being stopped on the way home
from permissible late night activities. 267 Adult violent offenders and delinquent
minors who would be willing to risk the larger penalties for the crimes they
268
commit at night will continue about their business, unaffected by the curfew.

259
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Although various constitutional challenges continue to be brought
against juvenile curfews, the best argument for invalidation is that they violate
minors' fundamental right to freedom of movement. On this specific challenge,
each of the circuits that have addressed the issue have applied their own unique
analysis, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has been
the only United States Appeals Court to get it right thus far.2 69 Children, as citizens of the United States, should possess all of the rights and protections afforded by the constitution. One of the core values of this country is liberty, and
freedom of movement is inherent to this ideal. Freedom of movement should be
considered a fundamental right, and courts should not be permitted to define that
right out of existence just to satisfy the public. The United States Supreme
Court has held that the government may regulate children to a greater degree
271
than adults, 270 but in order to do so, the circumstances should be exceptional.
The Bellotti test should be used to determine whether the circumstances are sufficiently exceptional by examining the state's interest. Some courts have used
Bellotti as a justification for reducing the degree of scrutiny applied, 272 but this
is not a correct interpretation.
Juvenile curfews owe their recent resurgence and popularity to politicians who use them as a tool to win public affection, even though the efficacy of
273
these ordinances in reducing juvenile crime and victimization is unproven.
Although the stated policy reasons behind juvenile curfews are legitimate, it is
not clear that the means employed will achieve those goals. However, even if
curfews are effective, there are better and less intrusive ways to reduce juvenile
crime, prevent harm to minors, and increase parental responsibility. Proactive
solutions such as school based programs, supervised recreation, employment
opportunities, anti-gang programs, youth gun violence reduction programs, and
other intervention programs that are more likely to achieve those goals should
be implemented, rather than violating the fundamental rights of minors. Like
most states, West Virginia has fallen victim to political pandering as well.2 74 It
is disheartening to think that the fundamental rights of the state's youth are being tossed aside in an ineffectual effort to satisfy public fears.
Toni L. Conner
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271
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